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INTRODUCTION  
General William W. Momyer, United States Air Force commander in Vietnam and 
participant in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, has written that the central lesson of his 
experience in three wars is that "airpower can win battles, or it can win wars . . ..  [F]ew 
distinctions in war are more important."1  Arguably, the United States had dramatically 
learned this lesson about airpower by the Gulf War.  The same lesson applies to 
terrorism.  Tactical responses can "win battles;" they can help to protect a particular 
target, thwart a particular bomber, or harden against a particular weapon, but they cannot 
defeat a strategy of terrorism.  Only strategic responses to terrorism can "win wars."  
The advent of significant instances of domestic terrorism in the United States, 
particularly the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the 1995 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, can prompt a 
tactical focus on terrorism.  The transition from an international terrorism threat to the 
United States to a domestic-based threat leads to a jurisdictional shift within the US 
government, with the Justice Department replacing the State Department as lead agency 
and a number of other organizational and jurisdictional additions, deletions, and shifts in 
responsibility.  It can also lead to a shift from viewing and responding to terrorism as a 
strategic, national security issue to a focus on it as domestic, federal politics under the 
tactical categorization of criminal justice policy.  It is the position of this article that any 
shift from a strategic to a tactical approach to terrorism has a limiting effect on counter-
terrorism policy and its implementation.  Countering terrorism requires complementary 
strategic and tactical responses, all undertaken from an integrating strategic perspective.  
These points are applicable to strategies of terrorism everywhere, even though this article 
specifically addresses the terrorism problem from the perspective of the United States.  
This article proceeds from the position that lessons unlearned are not lessons at all.  It 
therefore combines selected, well-established lessons from past experience with terrorism 
into the contemporary context of terrorism as it affects the United States, adding its own 
terrorism model and framework for revising the US response policy.  The article first 
presents tactical and strategic views of terrorism, comparing and contrasting the 
implications of each perspective on counter-terrorism policy and operations, particularly 
as the United States begins facing domestic terrorism.  It then reviews the central lessons 
learned from over two decades of addressing external, international terrorism as it has 
affected the United States, suggesting an outline for responding strategically to terrorism.  
After reviewing the evolution and current state of US government terrorism policy and 
organization, it recommends a policy framework for the United States to counter 
terrorism based on an application of the strategic view.  
TERRORISM:  STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL VIEWS  
In general terms, terrorism is calculated violence applied toward coercive intimidation or 
provocation.2  The "calculated violence" component points to a focus on the instrumental 
act -- the bomb or the gun, the shooter, the victim, the violence.  The "coercive 
intimidation or provocation" points to the ultimate objective -- the creation of fear as 
leverage toward changing some aspect of government or society.  The central point is that 
terrorism cannot effectively be viewed as one or the other; it is not simply the act, nor is 
it simply the objective.  Both perspectives are essential to fully understand, analyze, and 
respond to terrorism.  
This article deals with political terrorism -- a strategy of violence within a broader 
political context.  This rules out the violent act of the single criminal or deranged 
individual acting toward personal ends, and it excludes the occasional use of 
indiscriminate violence as a tactic within a wider revolutionary campaign.  Terrorism 
here is the strategy, the central manifestation of the political violence, and the vehicle 
designed to reach the political end.3  The terrorism addressed here is the "systematic 
political terrorism"4 that the world has seen since the 1970s.  
Today terrorism has taken a new turn, finding victims and targets within the borders of 
the United States.  RAND data shows that US citizens and property were the favored 
targets of international terrorists every year from 1968 to 1994.5  US diplomats and 
missions, business personnel and facilities, and military personnel and bases overseas 
were the direct objects of the attacks.  But few of those attacks occurred within US 
borders.  Today that situation is changing.  In the decade of the 1990s, the US has begun 
to see internationally inspired attacks within its borders, as well as incidents of home-
grown terror.  But regardless of the location of the act or the origin of the cause or group 
behind the attack, systematic political terrorism fits into a single mold, and it must be 
examined as the strategy it is.  David Fromkin presents a comprehensive characterization 
of the strategy of terrorism.  
All too little understood, the uniqueness of the strategy lies in this:  that it achieves its 
goal not through its acts but through the response to its acts.  In any other such strategy, 
the violence is the beginning and its consequences are the end of it.  For terrorism, 
however, the consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a 
stepping stone toward objectives that are more remote.  Whereas military and 
revolutionary actions aim at a physical result, terrorist actions aim at a psychological 
result.  
But even that psychological result is not the final goal.  Terrorism is violence used in 
order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead 
somebody else -- not the terrorist -- to embark on some quite different program of action 
that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires.6
Viewing terrorism as a strategy widens the perspective to address the entire process, 
including elements behind and preceding the specific act, that act, and the ultimate goals 
the strategy seeks to fulfill.  It addresses the element of fear and the target of that fear.  In 
doing so, it does not neglect the act itself, the elements of which we call the tactical 
environment, yet it specifically includes the broader political context of the given act, or 
what we label the strategic environment.  A graphic depiction of the entire "process" is at 
Figure 1.  
The tactical environment consists of the direct elements involved in a given act of 
terrorism:  the terrorist, the weapon, the victim, and the act itself.  Terrorist actors are 
difficult to categorize.  While different groups seek to recruit specific segments of 
society, "All that can be said with any degree of confidence is that terror was (and is) a 
pursuit of young people, and that in most other respects the differences between terrorists 
are more pronounced than the features they may have in common."7  Terrorist victims 
also defy easy categorization.  Other than the fact that Americans predominate as targets 
of international terrorism, and that among Americans diplomats, businessmen, and 
members of the military services have been most at risk, victims have represented a wide 
range of people and things:  men, women, and children; young and old; famous and 
ordinary; planes, trains, ships, cars, and buildings.  
But terrorist weapons and tactics do fit into predictable patterns, and their use can also be 
grouped around related acts.  Bombs have been and continue to be the favored mode of 
attack.  They account for almost half of all attacks (46 percent), and that percentage has 
been stable (between 40 and 50 percent) since 1968.  Second come attacks on 
installations (by weapons, arson, and sabotage other than bombing) at 22 percent since 
1968.  Hijackings are a distant third (12 percent), with assassinations (6 percent), and 
kidnapping (1 percent) rounding out the top five.8  Bombings require few people, can be 
carried out with relatively crude devices, allow the bomber a fair chance to escape prior 
to detonation, and today can incorporate new and sophisticated explosives, timers, and 
fuses.9  
Thus, the tactical environment and its elements are relatively straight-forward, are well 
known and studied, and are important in both responding to an individual act and 
designing a general response policy.  Both investigation and prevention rely heavily on 
specifics of the tactical environment.  Certain groups may prefer particular victims, a 
particular style of device or type of explosive or weapon, follow a predictable modus 
operandi, or even fit a specific personnel profile.  Such characteristics are key to solving 
a specific criminal incident or seeking to block an identifiable category of attack.  But the 
larger, strategic environment is central to a broader attempt to understand and defeat the 
terrorist.  "[Terrorism's] success seems to be due in large part to a miscomprehension of 
the strategy by its opponents.  They have neglected the more important of the two levels 
on which terrorism operates."10  
The strategic environment, the "more important of the two levels," begins with the cause 
behind the strategy of terrorism.  "Causes may be broadly conceptualized as any one of 
an array of observable economic, political, social, and/or psychological factors."11  
Causes are those long-term (social inequities, political disenfranchisement, economic 
depressions) or short-term (ethnicity, relative deprivation, government repression) 
conditions which underlie the resort to a strategy of terror.12  There are at least three 
broad categories:  redress of grievance, overthrow and replacement of the existing 
government/system, and liberation from "foreign" masters.13  Whatever the specific set of 
factors behind the strategy, the cause serves as the driving force for recruitment, support, 
and planning -- all of which are sub-elements of organization.  
Broadly defined, organization includes a range of subordinate elements essential to 
carrying out the strategy such as planning, surveillance (intelligence), transportation, 
papers and identification, arms, money (finance), publicity and propaganda, and 
command and control as functions of organization.14  Or "organization provides the 
formalized structure utilized for the planning, coordination, and application of 
extranormal forms of political violence."15  It includes the terrorist political and 
"military" infrastructures that form the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the 
strategic and tactical sides of the movement.16  Taken as a whole, organization is a 
critical part of the strategy, and it provides a central focus for defeating that strategy.  
The key linkage to the tactical environment, the linchpin that activates the strategy into 
an act of terrorism, is motivation.  It is here that an individual or group chooses to carry 
out specific acts of violence in support of the strategy.  Motivation translates cause into 
action, and it applies the organization at the tactical level, indicating the short-term level 
of popular support, recruitment, and operational capabilities.  Just as causes are varied 
and organizations range from simple to complex, motivation is difficult to generalize.  
"Any explanation that attempts to account for all its many manifestations is bound to be 
either exceedingly vague or altogether wrong."17   Context is the answer here, and it is the 
principal contribution of the strategic perspective.  The broad context, the strategic 
environment, holds the answers to most questions about who, how, and why terrorism 
exists and operates at a given place and time.  
The linchpin on the output side of the act is fear -- the psychological effect and the 
critical dynamic of the terror.  It too must be analyzed within the strategic context of 
terrorism.  Strategic terrorism is, at base, an extreme form of psychological warfare, and 
the broader fear engendered by the act lends its ultimate credibility.  The means are 
justified by the ends, and the end is that the target reacts due to fear.18  
That fear is designed to evoke a response from the ultimate target of the act, the 
government or society.  The intention may be that the government change its external 
policy, changing its support to or from a nation or government.  Or it may be to discredit 
the government, graphically demonstrating that it cannot control its territory or protect its 
citizens -- that it cannot govern.  It might be to drive a wedge between the government 
and its people.  Or it could be simply to publicize and recruit to a cause.  In all of these 
cases, and more, the act and its victim(s) will be directly or symbolically linked to the 
target, and the fear is intended to transfer the effect from the act to the behavior of that 
target.  
Finally, the terror is intended to cause that target to react in a specific way.  This is the 
end goal, the overall objective of the strategy.  Government or society must change, and 
the strategy points directly, as a continuum from its root cause, toward affecting that 
change.  Government or social reaction -- whether over-reaction, under-reaction, or 
pointed reaction -- is the goal at the output end of the process, and the strategy succeeds 
or fails only as a function of the direction and degree of the reaction it achieves.  Those 
reactions and the objectives they seek will generally fall under one of the following: 
recognition, intimidation, coercion or provocation.19  
Recognition  
Recognition is important for all terrorist groups.  They seek to publicize and legitimize 
their cause, and a terrorist incident guarantees immediate news coverage.  A terrorist 
incident will draw attention to a particular issue and perhaps galvanize the general public 
to support the organization's cause.  Incident timing and the specific victim/nature of the 
act is often tailored to "get the message across."  For the terrorist, the media is a critical 
tool for getting his message out -- a violent act guarantees media coverage.  Media is a 
business, and news organs will give their attention to stories that attract viewers or 
readers.  As one observer commented, "nothing is so newsworthy as violence."20  There 
is also a concern that if they do not give coverage to incidents, terrorism will escalate in 
violence until the media finally gives in.  Ultimately, even the threat of violence can lead 
to publicity for the terrorist cause.  
Terrorists also require funds and recruits, guns and materials, money and logistics.  Often 
they seek recognition directly in support of building and sustaining their infrastructure.  
Robbing banks or armories, seeking publicity for recruitment as well as to further their 
political cause, terrorists often undertake fairly "normal" criminal acts to secure this 
essential support.  This can be a point of vulnerability for the group, and criminal patterns 
should be monitored to track terrorist cycles of infrastructure building.  
Intimidation  
When organizations find they lack public support, they may turn to terrorist activities as a 
means to frighten society to act in a specific way.  This is the "terror" in terrorism.  The 
target in this case is the population as a whole, with their fear and anxiety designed to 
force the government or the economic system to make the changes proposed by the 
terrorists.  Terrorists might choose as victims only those segments of the population 
which are linked to their cause.  For instance, left-wing groups might initiate a bombing 
or assassination campaign against financial or industrial leaders, and "ecoterrorists" often 
focus their attacks on developers and the timber industry.  
Coercion  
A group may try to coerce the government into taking certain actions in an attempt to 
bring about societal changes.  Terrorist incidents with coercion as the objective are 
quickly followed by specific demands and threats of further violence.  Kidnappings and 
hijackings are popular tactics here because they provide the terrorists with bargaining 
chips and hold the possibility of being resolved without permanent injury to the victims.  
Such activities are often conducted in response to government actions -- "revenge" by a 
terrorist group is primarily a means of encouraging the government not to repeat an 
action.  
   
Civilian casualties are an important consideration of coercion. Terrorists realize that their 
demands may be lost in the confusion that would follow an incident like the destruction 
of Pan Am Flight 103 or the bombing of the World Trade Center.  They must consider 
that civilian causalities may anger the public and lead to demands for government 
retaliation.  Public officials would be less likely to negotiate with a group that committed 
such an act.  The power, then, lies more in the threat of violence than in violence itself.  
For this reason, events such as kidnappings and hijackings, small-scale actions such as 
assassinations, and acts of violence which appear random but which cause few, if any, 
injuries, are more likely to be perpetrated by groups that see coercion of the government 
as their goal.  
Provocation  
Another means of increasing support for a cause is to decrease support for the 
government.  Terrorists may commit acts designed to provoke the government into a 
response that will be resented by members of the public.  Warrantless searches, 
roadblocks, repressive measures against civilians -- all of these can reduce the trust 
people have in their government, leading to acceptance of the terrorist perspective as the 
more attractive alternative.   Provocation can best be accomplished by attacking the 
government directly and inflicting significant damage/casualties on it.  The hope is that 
there will be some within government who will seek revenge against the terrorists, and 
their response may have an impact on innocent, law-abiding civilians.  Fromkin wrote 
"Brutality is an induced governmental response . . . that has enabled terrorist strategies to 
succeed in many situations . . . ."21  
Governments need to recognize the objective(s) behind the action because the entire 
cause-to-objective chain might then be evident, allowing the response to focus directly at 
the terrorist strategy.  They also need to understand the nature of the groups most likely 
to constitute the domestic threat within the United States.  
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC TERRORISM  
Today the United States faces a rising threat of international terrorism perpetrated on its 
soil, as well as a growing threat from indigenous US groups.  The 1990s provided two 
powerful boosts to international terrorism directed against the United States.  First, the 
end of the Cold War lifted restraints from political movements and groups while also 
spurring regional and national instability in many areas.  As the one remaining 
superpower and "leader" of the movement toward a new world order, the United States 
found itself blamed for a host of international disorders and perceived slights.  At the 
same time, the Gulf War demonstrated the futility of attempting conventional warfare 
against that "repressive" United States. The combination of the two factors caused some 
to turn to terrorism in their efforts to achieve political ends that they saw the United 
States as blocking.  Particularly in an era of open transnational communications and 
transportation, the United States must be fully cognizant of the threat from international 
terrorism.  It must also prepare to face its own terrorism at home.  
The American tradition of political violence has been somewhat limited compared to 
much of the Western world.  American society is violent in many ways, but violence for 
political ends has been relatively muted.  Only the violent labor incidents of the late 
1800s and early 1900s stand out as recurring examples of political violence.  Beyond 
labor violence, the United States has long seen the use of violent intimidation by the Ku 
Klux Klan to further its racist and right-wing social ends, and groups on the left such as 
the Symbionese Liberation Army and the Weathermen have also employed terror tactics.  
However, these groups have never progressed beyond the far fringes of mainstream 
American society.  The lack of a domestic tradition of terrorism perhaps led many to a 
false belief that the United States would not face any significant domestic terrorist threat.  
This is not the case in the 1990s.  
Domestic Left-Wing Terrorism  
Left-wing groups have a distinctive political and economic, redistributive focus.  They 
tend to organize in urban areas, often forming a cause around the urban underclasses, but 
they often draw their members from the middle and upper classes.  They favor a classical 
cellular structure, and they tend to target facilities with clear symbolic attachments to the 
government (visible centers of governmental authority) or symbols of capitalism such as 
banks or large corporate headquarters.22  Although a factor in the 1960s and 1970s, some 
predict only a minor future threat from the left as a result of the collapse of European and 
Soviet communism.23  
Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism  
Right-wing groups temper their politics with social agendas.  Many of these groups trace 
their origins and philosophy to the Christian Identity Movement.  A few could be classed 
as religious extremists, willing to take more risks and give up their lives in support of a 
"righteous" cause.  As the new millenium approaches, there are many who see the signs 
of the return of Christ and the conclusion of the war with Satan.  The time is ripe for 
action, and often that action may be directed against society at large.  Millenarian 
movements are inherently monistic in their view of the future (God will rule) but dualistic 
in their view of the present (God and Satan are engaged in total war).  Since complex 
societies tend to be pluralistic in nature, as is the United States, the door to conflict and 
violence continues to open wider as the end of the millenium looms closer.24  
For those not quite so extreme, their beliefs still provide justification in their minds for a 
wide range of activities that violate the law.  Their politics are strongly anti-Communist, 
their recruitment base is among lower socio-economic class whites, and they are 
normally based in rural areas.  Rather than the cellular structure of the left, the right-wing 
groups tend to be part of larger, even national, networks.  Since this can compromise 
security, they often have a secure camp or compound, isolated in a rural area, to which 
they can fall back for protection.25  Their targets include opposing racial or religious 
groups (blacks and Jews bear the brunt of these attacks) as well as federal law 
enforcement agencies and local federal officials who are seen as oppressing them.26  
Observers predict an increase in right-wing activity due to such issues as affirmative 
action, immigration, and a perception of minorities as a burden on society.27  The true 
validity of their issues is not important; the fact that they have become politicized around 
these issues is the spur to action.  
Domestic Single-Issue Terrorism  
As the name implies, these organizations focus on one issue that is important to them.  
Their political and economic views span the spectrum from left to right, depending on 
their issue of choice.  Groups such as animal rights groups, anti-tax groups, and 
skinheads fall into this category.  They may follow either the left-wing or the right-wing 
model, depending on their issue of choice, but their targets fall into a fairly narrow 
range.  Certain extreme anti-abortion groups have also been energized to use lethal force 
within this decade, and the potential for such violence continues.  These groups may well 
be prone to further violence as their "war" continues.28  
The United States is not only the tactical site of such terrorism, but it is also part of the 
strategic purpose -- the United States government is the target of this terrorism.  So the 
strategic perspective, which incorporates both the tactical environment of the act and its 
broader political, strategic context, provides a full picture of terrorism from its root cause 
to its ultimate effect.  The perspective also points out the critical linking mechanisms, 
motivation and fear, which connect the strategic cause and organization to the act and 
through that act to its target and objective.  These linchpins are critical to the success of 
the strategy, and they present attractive targets for a strategy of response.  A cause creates 
general support, which must be channeled and operationalized through effective 
organization to motivate individuals to take up arms against a victim in an attack of 
terror.  On the output side, that act is designed to generate fear so that the fear will affect 
a specific target, a government and/or society, to generate a change in behavior that 
supports the objective for which the strategy of terror was adopted.  All of these elements 
must be analyzed and understood to design an effective response, and the international 
experience with political terrorism across the past 25-30 years provides guidance for the 
United States as it enters the twenty-first century.  
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:  LESSONS LEARNED  
While the advent of terrorist incidents on United States' territory is relatively new, the US 
and the international community have extensive experience in dealing with terrorism.  
That experience has presented some clear indicators, cautions, and lessons to be applied 
in responding to the current occurrence of domestic terrorism.  And the core lessons that 
experience imparts point to the necessity to view and respond to terror within its strategic 
context.  
Experience teaches that focusing on the tactical environment alone cannot defeat 
terrorism.  But neither can a focus solely on the root causes of disaffection.  Terrorism 
often continues even after it is clear that it cannot succeed.  Activism takes precedence 
over ideology, and the continuation of the strategy becomes paramount even without any 
chance for success.  So it is futile to attempt to remove the root causes as a singular 
response strategy, just as it is to ignore those root causes.29  Terrorism requires an 
integrated response strategy.  The general structure of that response should incorporate 
the micro, or tactical, level -- anti-terrorism elements based on tactical information to 
prevent or limit attacks, as well as counter-terrorism elements based on responding to 
specific acts.  It must also incorporate macro, or strategic, level responses -- laws and 
legislation to target causes and motivation, as well as forces and intelligence aimed at the 
terrorist organization.30  Above all, it must attempt to mitigate the fear, reinforce the 
target, and avoid the reaction that the terrorist seeks.  "Terrorism wins only if you 
respond to it in the way that the terrorists want you to; . . . its fate is in your hands and not 
in theirs."31  
The integrated response should seek to isolate the terrorist via a political, strategic 
approach so that a tactical, criminal justice response can deliver the knockout punch.  The 
terrorist who is viewed as extremist, whose objectives and methods are widely 
discredited within the target society, who has no real support base upon which to expand, 
can be effectively trivialized as a political threat and treated solely as a criminal justice 
matter.32  The key is to affect that isolation.  Avoid any statement or public action that 
will legitimize the cause or magnify the effect of the terrorism.33  Refuse to do what the 
terrorist wants you to do, and you will have already begun that process of isolation.  
The tactical response focuses on the modus operandi -- the specific weapons, tactics, 
training, operations, and personnel involved in the act -- and remains at the center of 
preventative and criminal justice elements of the overall response.  The integrated 
response strategy, however, builds beyond the tactical environment to incorporate a 
strategic focus on the linking mechanisms -- motivation and fear.34  These linking 
mechanisms are the keys to isolating the act within its broader context, limiting the 
effectiveness of the terror.  This is particularly true when examining and responding to 
terrorism at home.  Wilkinson states it clearly:  
And the terrorists judge their own "success" or "failure" primarily in terms of political, 
psychological and propaganda impact rather than purely by the traditional military 
criteria of deaths and damage caused. . . . Whereas it may well be possible to engage in 
trend analysis and prediction over the range of international and transnational terrorism, 
internal terrorist dangers can only be properly and thoroughly assessed in relation to the 
unique context of the campaign concerned.35
Examination of the strategic, political context -- the nature of the movement, its resources 
and aims, the degree and sources of support, the reception and influence of its message -- 
indicates the relative strengths and weaknesses of the campaign and of its target 
government/society.  That context highlights the critical points that the terrorism is 
targeting, and those centers of gravity which can isolate, even trivialize, the terrorists and 
their campaign.  Once they are isolated, a continuing emphasis on the criminality of their 
acts can be effective, and a criminal justice response can then eliminate their leadership 
and infrastructure.  A public emphasis on the criminality of the act serves to avoid 
glorifying (and thereby magnifying) the terrorism while also establishing a foundation for 
the ultimate criminal justice campaign once isolation is achieved.  
The United States has some particular vulnerabilities, and the strategic perspective can 
also help with them.  The open, activist press makes it difficult to block terrorists from 
gaining the publicity they seek.  Terrorism is theater, and the American press guarantees 
a stage.  The response, therefore, should ensure that the government mounts an 
interactive press campaign in conjunction with its other actions.  Trying to "lock out" the 
press can only fuel press speculation, which could ultimately harm the government 
effort.  The strategic response, then, should include a proactive media relations and 
information effort to facilitate a non-detrimental press role.  
Similarly, the open US society yields ready access to technologies and other resources, as 
well as to alienated or angry anti-government constituencies.  America's  relatively open 
borders also allow the import of terrorist actors, equipment, and ideas.36  The strategic 
response must recognize that our open society is actually a strength against terrorism -- 
the central objective of the response must be to preserve the rule of law and the force of 
democracy.37  The terrorist may well be seeking government overreaction and the 
imposition of repressive measures against target segments of society.  Therefore, 
government should refuse to do what they want it to do.  
A central operational lesson from international experience fighting terrorism is that the 
response strategy must be founded in clear objectives, well understood at all levels and 
among all segments of the response effort, so that the integrated efforts all head in the 
same direction.  A fragmented, disjointed response cannot enjoy a maximum impact on 
terrorism.38  Another lesson is that the policy must be built upon a consistent hard line -- 
no concessions and no political negotiations at any level.  The United States is still trying 
to overcome the damage done by relaxing that standard in Lebanon in the 1980s, and the 
integrated domestic response must not deviate from the hard line.  A "soft line" destroys 
the long-term deterrent effect of counter-terrorism policy, and serves as an invitation to 
further terrorism.39  Clear objectives and a hard-line approach support both the strategic 
focus on attacking the linking mechanisms of the terrorism process and the integration of 
tactical and strategic responses under that umbrella effort.  
Another lesson from the fight against international terrorism is that while protective 
measures are important, they cannot defeat terrorism by themselves.  Protective 
hardening and increased border screening, for example, can help to limit certain attacks, 
but such prophylactic efforts are only fully effective as part of a broader, strategic 
response effort.40  What is essential at both the strategic and tactical levels is intelligence 
-- governments must "know your enemy" in order to defeat him.  This intelligence effort 
must incorporate strategic as well as tactical indicators.  Governments need to fully 
understand the strategy behind the acts of terrorism in order to defeat that strategy.41  
Finally, perhaps the most central lesson from fighting international terrorism is that all 
agencies, levels, and approaches of the response must be coordinated into a single 
integrated response.  Turf battles and bureaucratic differences must be overcome, one 
agency's tactical strength must be complemented by another's strategic expertise, and the 
whole "orchestra" must be following the same sheet of music to gain success.  
Responding effectively to terrorism requires flexibility, coordination, and interoperability 
(in training, equipment, organization, and, above all, communication).  The strategic 
response also needs a broad consensus of support and cooperation from diverse sectors of 
the government and society.  And the response must be dynamic, further heightening the 
requirement for coordination and communication.  It must be built upon both a 
framework and a process of coordination.  Forming an interagency group is not enough; a 
true coordinative process must be built, exercised, and employed for success.42  
US Policy and Structure for Responding to International Terrorism  
The United States built and adapted a terrorism response structure across the years to deal 
with international terrorism.  This effort was far from integrated -- it was and is 
characterized by incrementalism and fragmentation, which are primary characteristics of 
US public policy.  Now, as it enters into the intermestic (combined international and 
domestic policy) and domestic policy arenas, federalism is further fragmenting the effort.  
The US government first addressed international terrorism as a result of the Munich 
Olympic attack in 1972.  President Nixon formed a Cabinet Committee to Combat 
Terrorism with representation from 10 agencies, later adding a working group with 11 
additional agencies.  This structure proved unwieldy, so an Executive Committee was 
formed with representation from only those 11 agencies actually having jurisdiction over 
terrorism responses.  By several accounts, this series of bodies was found wanting 
because of size, bureaucratic politics, and lack of focus.43  However, this structure is 
typical of US responses to national security issues, and it remains the basic foundation 
behind all later policy efforts through to today.  
The Carter Administration retained the basic interagency structure under the umbrella of 
the National Security Council (NSC) interagency working groups.  However, Carter 
assigned primary responsibility for countering terrorism to the Special Coordination 
Committee of the NSC, the crisis management side, giving US policy a decidedly 
operational center.  Even so, the working group grew, with 30 organizations ultimately 
represented in the process, and the effectiveness of both the process and its products was 
degraded.44  
President Reagan shifted primary responsibility back to the policy side of the NSC 
process, assigning the terrorism portfolio to the Senior Interdepartmental Group for 
Foreign Policy and creating four functional working groups, but retained the operational 
policy focus in practice.45  What Reagan did add was a specific state focus, defining 
much of the international terrorism problem in terms of state sponsorship, and an 
aggressive posture toward responding -- through diplomatic, economic, and military 
means.  By 1986 Vice President Bush completed a comprehensive policy review, 
codifying the Reagan changes into formal policy but not making any substantive changes 
to policy or structure.46  
Similarly, even though faced with two major incidents of terrorism on US soil, the 
Clinton Administration has made only marginal adjustments to US counter-terrorism 
strategy and structure.  The Clinton policy emphasizes international cooperation toward 
economic and political isolation of proponents of terrorism (retaining the Reagan 
emphasis on state sponsorship and international terrorism).  On the domestic side, Clinton 
has gained increased resources for counter-terrorism, with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI, the lead agency for domestic terrorism) the main recipient of this 
increased funding.47  The US military has also been given a slightly expanded domestic 
charter to deal with the weapons of mass destruction threat, but it is still strictly delimited 
from most domestic operations.  
Thus, the United States policy response to terrorism has developed incrementally across 
the years, retaining its fragmented, multi-agency working group structure under the 
umbrella of the National Security Council interagency framework.  It retains an 
international terrorism/state sponsorship focus, and an incident response, lead agency 
character with international and domestic divisions at the operational level.  This 
structure has been judged to be overly bureaucratic and "not coherent;"48 "massive," 
"cumbersome," and lacking basic cooperation;49 and "outmoded and unsustainable"50 by 
various observers.  
As this international terrorism response structure has developed with horizontally 
fragmented national security and operational agencies, the addition of domestic, law-
enforcement agencies promises to add a significant degree of vertical fragmentation.  The 
federal structure of the United States creates overlapping legal and operational 
jurisdictions between national, state, and local governments, with no effective mechanism 
to ensure cooperation in most policy arenas.  The US policy framework is not prepared 
for this additional fragmentation, and the lessons of the incremental, fragmented 
inefficiencies coming forward from the international terrorism experience seem to have 
been lost as the United States turns to domestic terrorism.  Simply adding more agencies 
and expanding the scope of an already cumbersome apparatus is not the best approach.  A 
tailored, focused, strategic response is the much superior choice.  
RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM:  A STRATEGIC APPROACH  
The targeted, integrated response advocated in this article has three essential elements.  
First, it must be proactive if it is to deter, defend, and respond so as to defeat a strategy 
of terrorism.  To be proactive it must be founded on clear, consistent objectives 
formulated with an understanding of and a determination to defeat terrorist objectives.  
Among these clear objectives must be to preserve democracy and the rule of law, and to 
respond to terrorism with the full consideration of a balance between civil liberties and 
security within our society.  Legitimacy of government must be maintained.  As one 
observer puts it,  
 the notion that a democratic status must necessarily abandon its defining principles in 
order to defeat terrorism is incorrect.  An ability to deal with terrorism in a way that is 
widely held to be in conformity with established political and judicial principles will, in 
actuality, strengthen the commitment to uphold democratic institutions and, thus, further 
isolate and weaken those who seek to destroy them.51
Another clear objective must be to refuse to overstate, and thus glorify, terrorism and its 
threat.  A corollary here is that the response must include a clear and deliberate media 
strategy.  Government officials must deal with the media, neither tipping the hand of their 
response nor contributing to the desired effect of the terrorism.  Terrorism is theater and 
the US press is capable, present, and in competition to "outdo" all rivals.  However, an 
inclusive strategy that acknowledges and proactively deals with the media is necessary to 
limit the marquee effect the terrorist seeks.  
Second, it must be comprehensive; it must respond strategically to the terrorist strategy.  
"There are not enough policemen to deal with an enemy likely to strike at any time 
against any target."52  The response must proceed from a strategic perspective, 
incorporating the tactical act only as a part of a larger strategic environment.  Within that 
strategic environment, a successful response must attack the linkages, terrorist 
motivations and societal fear, to isolate the terrorist from the target society.  Once 
isolated, even though the terrorist can still attack selected targets, the strategy of terrorism 
cannot hope to succeed, and tactical responses to the tactical acts can then deliver the 
"knockout" punch to terror.  A "hard line," no-concessions policy incorporating a clear 
and consistent emphasis on the criminality of the act will help achieve that isolation, and 
is a necessary element of the response.  This also helps to avoid glorifying the act and 
limits any temptation to see terrorists as martyrs to some grander cause.  
Finally, it must be integrated, cohesive, if it is to succeed in defeating terrorism.  This 
must include integration of the political and criminal dimensions of the response, its 
international and domestic components and structures, and its counter-terrorism and anti-
terrorism efforts.  The cohesion must incorporate intelligence, operations, and the 
suggested informational/media strategy.  This is perhaps the hardest part of the response 
to accomplish since it involves multiple agencies, cultures, and turf battles.  
Figure 3 depicts the reality of the current fragmented United States response structure.  
These multiple agencies and tracks must be brought into coordination, and that effort can 
only come from the top.  We do not advocate the formal creation of a "terrorism czar" 
around which to centralize organization.  That would create significant bureaucratic 
hurdles while also overstating the gravity of the threat from domestic terrorism.  We 
advocate lower-key coordination based on closer cooperation across the federal executive 
agencies and active discussion between federal and state officials directed by the cabinet 
and gubernatorial levels.  Our model would have the Attorney General added as a 
statutory advisor to the NSC, a move already under discussion to deal with intermestic 
organized crime, drugs, and immigration.53  The NSC system, through its 
interdepartmental working groups, would remain the focal point for coordinating the 
response structure.  The reorganized, tailored terrorism working group(s) would provide 
the structure and the process to allow bridging the international-domestic terrorism 
response gap while also serving as the departure point for an expanded coordinative 
effort.  Intramural cultural differences and turf conflicts such as that reported even within 
the FBI over jurisdiction and information sharing on three Georgia bombing incidents 
only further the terrorist effort by delaying and limiting the government response.54  
The working group must also reach out to the state and local structures responding to 
terrorism.  This effort would be furthered by the creation of an integrated terrorism 
response training program under FBI auspices but incorporating the range of federal, 
state, and local response agencies, to standardize response skills, terminology, and 
organization, while also providing a basis for intergovernmental interoperability.  As the 
US military has learned, often painfully, through its experiences in joint service and 
multinational coalition efforts, a common doctrine, training, equipment, and structure can 
go a long way toward easing the inevitable strains of interoperation.  Australia has 
created such a national training program, and today each subnational counter-terror 
organization shares a common language and structure, greatly enhancing coordination 
efforts.55  Canada has also increased training and coordination between the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, who have the primary operational counter-terrorism role, and 
major local police forces.56  Within the United States, local initiatives such as the Central 
Texas Counterterrorism Working Group can further interoperability and coordination as 
well.57  But the US national scope is much more complex than these models, largely due 
to the nature of American federalism and laws that strictly delimit military and national 
security organizations from active domestic roles.  The coordination effort must begin 
now and build continuously to enable an integrated terrorism response any time in the 
near-term future.  
An intermestic interagency framework, a common training foundation, and the 
establishment of an interactive network of federal, state, and local officials charged with 
countering domestic terrorism can help win the fight.  Knowing who to contact, what 
questions to ask, and what coordination and assistance to expect is essential to an 
effective and efficient integration of information and action to isolate and defeat 
terrorism.  And such strategic integration is needed to employ a comprehensive, proactive 
strategy for victory.  
A final point must be made:  how does one measure the success of such a proactive, 
comprehensive, and integrated strategic response?  What criteria can be employed to 
measure success?  There are some well-established criteria for measuring counter-terror 
effectiveness in quantitative terms.  These include incident rates, casualty counts, 
terrorists captured without replacement, and terrorists "neutralized" without replacement.  
But this list is incomplete, and many aspects of countering terrorism do not lend 
themselves to easy accessibility or quantification.58  The best criteria are the objectives of 
the policy as it is developed -- to what degree is the policy achieving its specific 
objectives?  But those "strategic" criteria will be very difficult to measure, leaving the 
analyst little alternative but to fall back to incident rates and other more easily 
quantifiable "tactical" measures.  But the policy analyst should not lose sight of the 
"strategic" criteria, however difficult they are to quantify, because those policy 
objectives, those strategic goals of the strategic approach, are the real measures of the 
effectiveness of the response.  Strategic responses "win wars," and this is a war that must 
be won.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The world, and the United States government, has endured three decades of modern 
political terrorism, calculated violence applied toward coercive intimidation or 
provocation.  Terrorist violence is applied for its psychological effects; to employ fear to 
ultimately force a government to react in some manner designed to further the terrorists' 
ends.  Today's political terrorism has found its way onto US soil, but the international 
experience can help defeat it before it finds deeper roots here.  Experience stresses that 
terrorism be viewed as a process, one linking the terrorist cause and organization via 
motivation to the violent action, and linking that action via societal fear to its real target, 
the government, in order to achieve its desired political objective through government 
action or inaction.  The process perspective also indicates the utility and necessity of a 
strategic response -- one targeted not just at the bomber, bomb, and victim, but at the 
cause-to-victim-to-objective chain.  A strategy of terrorism demands a strategic response, 
a strategy that must be proactive, comprehensive, and integrated to win.  
By itself, as has been said, terror can accomplish nothing in terms of political goals; it can 
only aim at obtaining a response that will achieve those goals for it.  
 . . . The important point is that the choice is yours.  That is the ultimate weakness of 
terrorism as a strategy.  It means that, though terrorism cannot always be prevented, it can 
always be defeated.  You can always refuse to do what they want you to do.59
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